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Counter-terrorism on the rail network is vital to the security of the UK. The British Transport 
Police (BTP) employ covert and overt security measures to prevent crime, which includes: 
closed circuit television, armed police, unarmed police, police community support officers, 
police dogs, stops and searches and awareness campaigns. All security measures aim to deter 
crime whilst importantly reassuring the public. We surveyed both members of the public and 
BTP officers about the perceived effectiveness of current security measures, specifically with 
regards to fear of terrorism. Feelings of reassurance and the perceived effectiveness of 
security measures were positively related. The most effective and reassuring security measure 
was the use of armed police; whereas the least effective and reassuring was the use of 
awareness campaigns. However, interestingly, qualitative analyses suggested that an increase 
in armed police without informed awareness campaigns would have a negative impact on 
public reassurance by increasing fear.  
Keywords: Counter-terrorism; British Transport Police; Public Reassurance; Armed Police; 
Awareness Campaigns; Fear of crime 
  




In the UK, ‘terrorism’ is an offence that involves the use or threat of violence or force, 
designed to intimidate the public or influence a government with the purpose of achieving a 
political, racial, religious or ideological cause (Terrorism Act, 2000). Although there is no 
universally and internationally accepted definition of terrorism (Townsend, 2011), the UK 
uses terrorism legislation such as Terrorism Act 2000 (Ss 54, 55) and Terrorism Act 2006 (Ss 
1-8) to outline terrorism offences; which include the preparation for, the planning of, 
incitement or encouragement to commit acts of terrorism. Since 2000, the volume of 
terrorism legislation has increased alongside the growing threat of terrorism (Staniforth, 
2001) both from international and domestic organisations (HM Government, 2011). The UK 
government regards terrorism as one of the highest priority risks and raised its terrorism risk 
register rating to ‘severe’ in August 2014; indicating that a terrorist attack on the UK is 
‘highly likely’ (Home Office, 2014). 
Although the chances of being victim to a terrorist attack in the UK are relatively 
small, fear of terrorism in the UK is much higher. Feelings of public safety are associated 
with increased public confidence in the police (HMIC, 2012) and so a key priority for 
policing is to ensure that ‘fear of crime’ is low. Research on fear of crime has identified how 
fear not only affects those who have been victim to criminal activity but also those who have 
not been directly exposed to crime (Warr, 2000); meaning that fear of crime is a 
psychological rather than objective measure. More recent advances on fear of crime research 
have highlighted variability in one’s fear of crime based on the context-dependent 
characteristics of one’s everyday environment (Solymosi, Bowers & Fujiyama, 2015). For 
example, an individual may not fear being victim to a terrorist attack at home but may fear it 
when commuting to work; likewise they might not fear being robbed during their commute to 
work but fear burglary at home. Despite this, much research exploring fear of crime tends to 
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view it as a holistic measure and there is relatively little research that investigates fear of 
terrorism directly, despite suggestions that people tend to overestimate both the risk of 
terrorism and their risk of being a victim of terrorism (Allouche & Lind, 2010). Furthermore, 
it has been suggested that as terrorism is by definition an act to cause ‘terror’ in society, that 
the psychological fear of terrorism is incredibly important for the development of counter-
terrorism strategies (Braithewaite, 2013). This paper sought to address these gaps, by 
investigating the fear of terrorism specifically within the context of fear on the rail network. 
 
Policing and counter-terrorism on the rail network 
The UK’s counter-terrorism ‘CONTEST’ strategy (2011) aims to, amongst other 
goals, reduce the vulnerability of the critical national infrastructure by increasing resilience in 
‘crowded places’. Recent devastating examples terrorist attacks in crowded places include the 
coordinated terrorist attacks that took place in Paris in November 2015, killing 130 civilians, 
and the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 67 civilians. 
Although public places in general are at risk of terrorist attacks, the transport networks 
specifically (as a part of the critical national infrastructure) have also been targeted, such as 
the Tokyo subway sarin attack of 1995, the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the 2005 
London bombings. This paper was interested in investigating the UK public’s perceptions 
with regards to fear of terrorism in the context of using the rail network.  
The British Transport Police (BTP) are responsible for ensuring public safety and 
implementing security measures to minimise disruption and anticipate potential threats of 
terrorism on the railway (Railways and Transport Safety Act, 2003). As such, one of the key 
aims of the BTP is to provide a safe and secure railway, free from disruption and fear of 
crime (BTP Mission Statement; Railways Act, 1993). One way to reassure the public is to 
make security measures more visible; which can have the dual effect of both reassuring the 
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public whilst deterring crime (Gore, 2012).  Overt security measures used by the BTP 
include: CCTV, armed and unarmed police, PCSOs, canine explosive detection units and 
public awareness campaigns (BTP Specialist Units [no date]). Yet paradoxically, the police 
cannot disclose all of their security measures without risking vulnerability from terrorist 
attacks (Morral & Jackson, 2009). These ‘covert’ methods can reduce public reassurance as 
they are not visible. Although the BTP acknowledges its use of covert non-visible methods 
(e.g. stop and searches, Counter-Terrorism Units), little is known about how these security 
measures interact with public reassurance. Interestingly, it has been suggested that increased 
exposure to counter-terrorist security measures specifically may in fact increase fear due to 
the irrational tendency for individuals to overestimate the likelihood of being victim to 
terrorist attacks (Braithwaite, 2013). This study sought to explore the relationship between 
perceived effectiveness of security measures and public reassurance against terrorism on the 
rail network more closely by surveying members of the public and BTP. This paper will 
briefly define each of the security measures that were examined; although it is worth noting 
that much of the available literature on deterrents relates to countering crime in general, 
rather than specific against terrorism. 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)  
CCTV is an effective and well utilised deterrent against crime in general as it is 
visible to potential criminals (Armitage, 2001) and can have a positive impact on public 
opinion (Honess & Chapman, 1992; RSSB, 2011). CCTV dissuades individuals from 
committing crime due to the potential for video evidence, even when CCTV is functionally 
inoperative (Armitage, 2001). Arguably however, CCTV may have little impact on macro-
levels of crime, as crime is simply displaced to areas without CCTV (Ratcliffe, Taniguchi & 
Taylor, 2009) or may only deter specific types of crime (Gill & Spriggs, 2005). Ratcliffe et al 
(2009) controlled for the effects of crime displacement, crime type and natural fluctuations in 
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crime prevalence and indicated an overall 13% reduction in crime in areas with CCTV. 
However, the effects of CCTV on terrorism are less well defined, with warnings that it may 
actually encourage terrorists to target areas with CCTV if they seek mass media coverage for 
their cause (Stutzer & Zehnder, 2013). Furthermore, it has been warned that CCTV may 
actually be counter-productive to feelings of public reassurance, as members of the public, 
particularly those from Muslim communities, feel that they are being spied upon and unjustly 
monitored by the Police and Government (Awan, 2011). 
Police: Armed Police, Unarmed Police and PCSOs 
The BTP are responsible for physically policing the railways with a mixture of armed 
police, unarmed police and PCSOs. The visibility of police officers is a key factor in the 
deterrence of crime (Simpson & Cohen, 1988); as (potential) criminals are less likely to 
commit crime if there is a high likelihood that they will be caught in the act (Wright, 2010). It 
is also a key feature to support the UK’s counter-terrorist CONTEST strategy (2011); 
specifically with regards to preventing terrorism (Lamb, 2013). Indeed, in direct response to 
the recent terrorist attacks in Paris (November, 2015), it was announced by the Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, that the Home Office has pledged an 
extra £34 million to fund police firearms capacity and that London will train an extra 600 
armed police officers as a counter-terrorist measure (BBC, January 2016). However, social 
work research on women in the Muslim community identified how visible policing can 
increase feelings of fear from potential insensitive and stigmatised policing practices (Guru, 
2012). Armed police were first used on the rail network in February 2002 and provide day-to-
day police patrol and resilience against potential terrorism and/or major incidents, with the 
aim to reassure the public via a visible armed presence and deter terrorism through an armed 
response (BTP Specialist Units [no date]). Although research exploring the police use of 
firearms in the UK is minimal, as the carrying of guns by the police is non-routine, research 
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from America suggests that the police use of guns may counter-intuitively increase crime as 
the public have little confidence in repressive policing strategies in areas where gun use (by 
both the police and public) is high (Glebbeek, 2010). Police use of force has the potential to 
both increase and decrease public confidence, depending upon whether its use is viewed as 
legitimate and lawful, or illegitimate and unlawful (Kuhns & Knutsson, 2010). Indeed many 
individuals, including police officers themselves, believe that the routine arming of police in 
the UK would undermine the police-public relationship (Orde, 2012). Yet, following recent 
rises in terrorism attacks and active shooter incidents, questions have been raised about 
whether the arming of police should be made routine (BBC, 2014). This study will help to 
unpack the relationship between fear of terrorism in the UK and the use of visible, armed and 
unarmed police.  
Police Dogs Unit 
The BTP has one of the largest Explosive Detection Dog Units in the country (BTP 
Media, 2013); which includes pro-active search dogs which sweep targeted areas for 
explosives, and passive explosive detection dogs monitoring the environment, crowd and 
luggage. Police dogs are valuable assets involved in all Counter Terrorism Patrols on the 
railways (Pastellas, 2013), because they are cost-effective, can outperform technology, and, if 
used correctly, can facilitate relationship-building with the public (Mesloh, 2006). Canine 
units are not only vital for the detection and deterrence of crime, but importantly facilitate 
public engagement and reassurance. However, very little academic research has been 
conducted into the interaction between the use police dogs and counter-terrorism. The limited 
studies to date have focussed how police dogs may injure police officers (Adedipe, Maher & 
Strote, 2013) and differences in training styles for canine handlers (Mesloh, 2006). This gap 
in the literature emphasises the worth of research into perceptions of police dogs as a counter-
terrorist measure. 
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Stop and Search 
The use of ‘stop and search’ powers to counter terrorism allows BTP Officers to 
implement an ‘unpredictable’ security measure, which is likely to deter potential terrorists 
from both preparing and carrying out attacks (Morall & Jackson, 2009). Stop and search 
powers heighten the public awareness of BTP presence, in turn reassuring their safety (BTP 
Specialist Units [no date]). Yet, due to the loose and unpredictable nature of stop and search 
powers, it has faced criticism from the media and members of the public, especially with 
ethnic minorities who felt subjected to ‘hostile reconnaissance’ (Borooah, 2011). The 
effectiveness of stop and search powers is dubious, for example, in 2010 there were 210,013 
reported stop/searches of which only 9 resulted in arrest (0.004%; Kirby, 2013). Research 
suggests that ethnic minority groups, particularly those who are Muslim, feel targeted by stop 
and search (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). Muslim women feel fearful of stop and search due 
to the risk of their children being unjustly stopped (Guru, 2012). Despite rules having been 
made more stringent in recent years, the negative connotations they are associated with may 
threaten public feelings of reassurance, particularly among ethnic minorities (Moeckli, 2007; 
Parmar, 2011). Much of the recent academic research on stop and search has thus focussed on 
the detrimental impact on ethnic minorities, rather than levels of reassurance among the 
population as a whole. This study will address this gap by providing a more general 
perspective from the public on the use of stop and search powers as a counter-terrorist 
security measure. 
Awareness Campaigns 
Awareness campaigns are used by the BTP to target two very different audiences; 
potential offenders and potential victims. When campaigns are aimed at the public (potential 
victims) and kept general and non-specific, they have been found to be generally ineffective 
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at reducing crime (Riley & Mayhew, 1980); however, campaigns that provide specific advice 
for preventing a particular type of crime, relative to a particular location have been associated 
with significant crime reduction (Barth, 2006). This may be because the public are more 
informed about how to report crime, spot suspicious behaviour and avoid victimisation, and 
so awareness campaigns may facilitate community policing (Skogan & Harnett, 1997). 
Indeed rail users felt more reassured against anti-social behaviour on the rail network 
following a targeted awareness campaign as they felt that anti-social behaviour was being 
addressed (RSSB, 2009). Victim focused campaigns also have the inadvertent benefit of 
deterring offenders, as they perceive crime to be more difficult as the public are more 
resilient (Laycock, 1991). Alternatively, campaigns specifically aimed at deterring offenders 
are most effective when they emphasise the certainty of arrest and punishment (Riley & 
Mayhew, 1980), and, like victim focussed campaigns, when they are targeted towards 
specific crimes in specific locations (Laycock, 1991). 
Summary 
Public mass transit rail networks in the UK are an invaluable part of the critical 
national infrastructure. The number of rail users in the UK has more than doubled over the 
past 15 years, with the government investing a further £16 billion investment in the ‘HS-2’ 
rail network to link eight major cities in the UK by 2026 (Department for Transport, 2012). 
The UK is also facing one of its biggest challenges to date in the fight against terrorism 
(Home Office, 2014), with historic examples highlighting how the mass rail network is a key 
target for such atrocities. As public fear of terrorism is an important psychological 
consequence of terrorism (Braithewaite, 2013) it was important to investigate public 
perceptions relating to fear of terrorism on the rail network. Furthermore, as this study sought 
to provide recommendations with regards to ‘what works’ in terms of security measures that 
may decrease fear of terrorism, it sought to establish whether the current security measures 
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implemented by BTP on the rail network were perceived to be effective and/or reassuring 
deterrents against terrorism by members of the public and BTP Officers. Using these 
findings, it will provide informed recommendations that may help to reduce fear ofterrorism 
on the rail network in the UK. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (n=235) were split into two groups; ‘public rail users’ (n=154) or ‘British 
Transport Police’ (BTP) (n=81). Participants’ ages ranged between 18 and 71 years (M= 
36.42 years, SD= 12.97), with 62.1% male (n=146) and 37.4% female (n=88). Public rail 
users were recruited from one of four major train stations in the UK (two in London; two in 
Northern England). They were approached at the station concourse and invited to complete a 
questionnaire. BTP participants were invited to complete the questionnaire during their 
working hours at one of three BTP police stations. 
Materials 
The questionnaire used in this study was constructed in liaison with a BTP 
representative. Questionnaires included open and closed questions to explore perceptions 
relating to terrorism, BTP security measures and perceived reassurance. Participants were 
asked these questions with regards to perceptions as a passenger on the rail network. 
Perceived effectiveness of security measures was measured by the question: ‘How well do you 
think the presence of [CCTV/armed police/police dogs/stop and search/Unarmed police/ 
PCSOs/ Awareness campaigns] deters terrorism?’ and scored from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very 
well). Feelings of reassurance were measured by: ‘How reassured do you feel by the security 
measures stated below against terrorism?’ and ranked their response from 1(less) to 5 
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(more). Participants could provide further descriptive comments about these issues in an open 
text-box. Questionnaires had excellent (public group) and good (BTP group) validity using a 
Cronbach’s Alpha test; scoring .923 and .82, respectively. 
Woolwich Attack 
 During the time in which this study was conducted, a terrorist attack occurred in 
Woolwich, UK resulting in the murder of fusilier Lee Rigby (Morrison, Lansdown & 
Pankhurst, 2013). Although there was no direct reference to this attack in the questionnaires 
and the attack did not take place on the rail network, questionnaires were coded as ‘pre’ and 
‘post’ Woolwich attack. This was to make use of a unique opportunity to see whether public 
opinion and fear of crime changed immediately following a terrorist-related incident. 
Results 
Perceived effectiveness and reassurance associated with security measures to deter 
terrorism 
The use of armed police was perceived to be the most effective security measure for 
deterring terrorism, with 84.3% of the total sample scoring it as ‘well’ or ‘very well’ as a 
method for deterring terrorism. This was followed by the use of police dogs (72.1%), stop 
and search powers (70%), CCTV (61.3%), unarmed police (60.8%), PCSOs (47.4%) and 
awareness campaigns (36.1%). Qualitative analyses of open-questions suggested this was 
driven by an overall desire for more visible policing on the railways: “More patrols on actual 
trains themselves; armed, un-armed and PCSO's walking through”.  
The use of police dogs had the greatest positive impact on feelings of reassurance 
with 81% of participants rating that they made them feel ‘reassured’ or ‘very reassured’. This 
was followed by armed police (80.8%), unarmed police (74.4%), stop and search powers 
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(73.9%), CCTV (58.5%), PCSOs (50.4%) and awareness campaigns (36.5%). BTP officers 
tended to favour the use of armed police: “Having a visible armed presence at X station 
would, in my opinion be a serious visible deterrent”; “We require more armed patrols at 
more locations”, along with increased visible policing in general: “A visible police presence 
always reassures the public”. The public also wanted an increase in armed police to deter 
terrorism: “I think they should have more armed police in public places”, however this was 
somewhat diluted by fear that: “armed police increase risk of harm to innocents”. A number 
of respondents commented on how increased visibility of armed patrols would increase fear 
as they associated their presence with unknown risk: “if I see armed police officers it makes 
me think there's an increased risk”. Interestingly, although the public generally viewed 
awareness campaigns as ineffective against terrorism: “High profile campaigns are useful. 
But they won't deter the fanatical”, they could be usefully adapted to reduce any counter-
productive fears associated with other counter-terrorism measures, such as increased armed 
police: “The presence of armed police can be worrying, without explanation. An increase in 
awareness campaigns explaining that they are a security measure rather than a reactive 
measure would cause an increased feeling of safety”. 
 
Overall, the use of armed police and police dogs were rated as the most effective and 
reassuring deterrents against terrorism, whereas the use of PCSOs and awareness campaigns 
were perceived as the least effective security measures (Figure 1). Perceived effectiveness of 
security measures was significantly and positive associated with feelings of reassurance 
against terrorism, rho = .515, p< .001. BTP officers were additionally asked to think about 
how security measures influenced feelings of reassurance for the public. There was a 
significant and positive relationship between BTP officers’ own perceived effectiveness of 
security measures and their judgements on public reassurance, rho = .340, p< .005. In terms 
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of differences between groups of participants, BTP participants (M = 19.6, SD =4.93) 
perceived security measures to be significantly more effective at deterring terrorism than the 
public (M = 16.11, SD = 5.24), t (230) = -4.940, p< .00, and were also significantly more 
reassured against terrorism (M = 20.4, SD = 4.28) than the general public (M =17.12, SD = 
5.21), t (233) = -4.856, p< .001. The general public were additionally asked about how 
satisfied they felt with security on the rail network. Perceived satisfaction with security on 
the rail network was significantly and positive related to perceived reassurance against 
terrorism, rho = .226, p< .01.  
 
Woolwich Attack 
During the period in which this study was being conducted, a terrorist attack occurred 
in Woolwich; although this incident did not occur on the rail network, it was a unique and 
unexpected opportunity to compare participant responses from before the attack (37.45%, 
n=88) to those after the attack (62.55%, n=147), to see how incidents of terrorism directly 
impact upon fear of terrorism. Those who were surveyed before the Woolwich attack were 
more reassured against terrorism (M= 19.09, SD= 4.62), compared to those who were 
surveyed after the attack (M= 17.75, SD= 5.38), and this was marginally significant, t (233) = 
1.95, p=0.05. Those surveyed before the Woolwich attack (M= 18.12, SD = 5.42) also 
perceived deterrents as more effective than those after the attack (M= 16.87, SD= 5.33), 
although this was non-significant, t (230) = 1.709, p=.089. 
Discussion 
Public confidence and a trusted relationship between the police and the public are 
important for community policing, as citizens must have faith that the police will protect 
society (Mesloh, 2006; Skogan & Harnett, 1997). As such, ensuring that the public feel safe 
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and reassured is a paramount responsibility of the police (HMIC, 2012). The use of armed 
police and police dogs were perceived to be the most effective and reassuring security 
measures against terrorism, compared to the use of awareness campaigns and PCSOs that 
were perceived as the least effective and reassuring. This study was the first of its kind to 
explicitly explore how specific security measures on the rail network interacted with public 
perceptions and fear of terrorism, thus providing a unique and practical contribution to the 
policing literature. Research on policing tactics has generally indicated that police use of 
force, either through firearms or canine patrols, can have a negative impact on public 
relations and reduce levels of trust with the public (Glebbeek, 2010; Orde, 2012). There has 
been recent debate in Scotland around the routine arming of police, which has received heavy 
criticism from the media, politicians and the public (BBC News, 2014). Yet the findings of 
the current study suggest the opposite effect; the public perceived the use of armed officers 
and police dogs as the most reassuring and effective tactics against terrorism. It will be 
interesting to continue monitoring this perception, especially with regards to fear of terrorism, 
following the recent announced increases in armed response units in the wake of the 2015 
Paris terrorist attacks. 
In explaining this unexpected finding, it is possible that the public perception of risk 
plays a role. Risk associated with terrorism may be deemed more extreme than threat 
associated with more general crime types, and thus the public become more accepting of 
increased police force. Indeed when proactive policing is perceived as legitimate by the 
public, then the public are more favourable in their judgements (Kuhns & Knutsson, 2010). 
Perhaps public reassurance is substantially influenced by feelings of personal risk and 
vulnerability. It was also found in this study that members of the public who were surveyed 
before the Woolwich terrorist attack were more reassured than those who were surveyed after 
the attack. The prevalence of terrorism in the news, even though it was not specifically linked 
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to the rail network, may have increased feelings of risk, which reduced feelings of 
reassurance.  
Indeed, when individuals feel threatened, they are more likely to show harsh or 
extreme behaviour towards out-group members (Wohl, Squires & Caouette, 2012), and so 
fears for risk of terrorism may have increased desire for police force. Finseraas and Listhaug 
(2013) found fear of terrorism increased in Western countries following the Mumbai attacks 
in 2008, and it has also been found that public threat perceptions with regards to terrorism are 
heavily influenced by the occurrence of mass-mediated threat messages by terrorist group 
leaders and by threat assessment alerts and announcements made by government (Nacos, 
Bloch-Elkon & Shapiro, 2007). Thus the offence of terrorism appears to be a distinct and 
different type of criminal activity that the public may be more fearful of, perceive as higher 
risk, and thus desire increased levels of force to feel reassured. The use of PCSOs scored 
poorly in this study, which may be because the public perceive them as having restricted 
powers (Cosgrove & Ramshaw, 2013) and so they are not seen as an extreme enough security 
measure against high risk terrorism. However, interestingly, it was found during the London 
2012 Olympics that public feelings of safety were relatively high, despite the widespread 
media criticism of the security measures provided by G4S (George & Mawby, 2015), 
suggesting that perceptions were not influenced by media coverage. It is possible that public 
desires for increased policing may not actually be related to a fear of terrorism, but a fear of 
crime in general. As data to empirically test how media reports of terrorism are hard to 
collect due to the unpredictable nature of when an attack may unfortunately occur, it is 
suggested that qualitative research to explore the factors that may increase or decrease fear of 
terrorism may be useful to unpack this relationship more fully. 
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Although the public were in favour of more aggressive policing tactics, analyses of 
qualitative comments indicated that they also felt fearful when seeing armed police if they did 
not know why there was an increase in force (i.e., to deter terrorism). Previous literature has 
identified this whereby an increase in counter-terrorist security measures may increase fear of 
being victim to attacks (Braithwaite, 2013). It has been suggested that awareness campaigns 
can be effective crime deterrents, but only when offering specific information about crimes 
(Barth, 2006; Riley & Mayhew, 1980) that can empower the public to spot and report 
criminal activity (Laycock, 1991). Interestingly, BTP officers did not anticipate potential fear 
as a result of increasing the number of armed officers on the rail network. It is possible that 
this is because BTP officers have a greater awareness and understanding of the training and 
expertise required of armed patrols and thus are better informed with greater confidence in 
their use. Indeed, public comments suggested a novel way to combine these two approaches, 
by proposing that the potential undesirable negative consequences that may arise from 
increased visible police force (i.e., fear) could be reduced by combining these security 
measures with public information campaigns to explain why the police were there (i.e., to 
deter terrorism). As such, an increase in armed police and canine units may facilitate public 
reassurance, but this must be caveated by transparent public messages that communicate the 
legitimacy and rationale of force. 
Conclusion 
This paper surveyed members of the public and the BTP to explore the perceived 
effectiveness of security measures used by the rail network to deter and reassure against 
terrorism. When individuals perceived measures to be effective deterrents, they also felt more 
reassured by them. Specifically, the use of armed officers and police dogs were perceived as 
the most effective deterrents, and were also more likely to be associated with feelings of 
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reassurance; whereas the use of PCSOs and awareness campaigns were perceived as the least 
effective and reassuring. Qualitative comments supported these views and provided 
recommendations for how security measures may be combined. Indeed, it was suggested that 
although awareness campaigns were generally ineffective security measures, they may 
usefully reduce the potential fear associated with the increased use of armed police by 
helping to inform the public. It is thus recommended with the expected increase in the 
number of armed officers expected in the UK in response to the Paris terrorist attacks that an 
informed awareness campaign is provided, especially if additional armed officers are to be 
operational on the rail network. 
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